Emission reductions programs may have specific requirements for reporting, which influences what is measured and how. For example, philanthropic or corporate social responsibility funders may prioritize indicators aligned with their mission and specific reporting may be required for the use of public funds.
The complexity of benefit sharing can make it difficult to design monitoring and evaluation systems that are adequately informative, diverse, and robust, while still ensuring that this component is not overly burdensome for the program.
Results from monitoring and evaluation can be used for more than just reporting, but also adaptive management. Analysis of results can inform emission reductions programs of what is working well or not and enable changes to benefit sharing arrangements that improve efficiency, equity, and effectiveness.
The inclusion of socioeconomic impacts in monitoring and evaluation systems, as opposed to solely focusing on environmental outcomes, is useful for improving effectiveness and can foster support from politicians, donors, and other stakeholders.
Monitoring is best kept as simple and practical as possible while still being adequate.
Beneficiary participation in monitoring activities in exchange for paid wages can constitute an important local benefit.
Adaptative management of the design and implementation of benefit-sharing arrangements based on the results of monitoring and evaluation is critical for improving effectiveness, efficiency, and equity over time. Piloting of benefit sharing can help facilitate adaptive management during the design phase.
Socioeconomic monitoring can help improve design of benefits
By addressing underlying barriers to land tenure, Peru’s Alto Mayo Protected Forest increased its effectiveness in delivering other benefits.
In Peru, the options provided for local people to select non-monetary benefits around the Alto Mayo Protected Forest (AMPF) changed a lot over time as implementers gained a deeper understanding of the social roots of the environmental problems in the area. Following an initial focus on coffee production, it was not until social surveys were done that the implementers understood that even though incomes were improving, beneficiaries were still dissatisfied.
There were much more fundamental barriers to human well-being that needed to be addressed, principally derived from living without land tenure security and in conflict with the law as illegal settlers in a protected area. The program had to branch out from addressing only deforestation through improving coffee yields to helping the local population to get tacit approval from the government to live in the protected area. This enabled the settlers to gain compliance with government stipulations but without access to all the services they desired, as the government would not provide these services in the protected area.
In this sense, the REDD+ program provided an opportunity to address not only economic drivers of deforestation but also fundamental issues surrounding security of home and place and peace with the park authorities. This, in turn, made conservation not only possible, but more efficient. But it was only through social survey work that this approach was developed and the benefit packages were adjusted.
From 1998 to 2016, eligibility through PINFOR was restricted to landowners able to demonstrate proof of title to at least 2 hectares of land.
This resulted in the majority of incentives going to larger private landowners, amid growing demand for broader participation
PINPEP was initiated in 2007, and allows access to forestry and agroforestry incentives for people without formal land tenure but who can prove that they have a legal right of possession to at least 0.1 hectares.
Formal title was a requirement for participation in the PSA.
This prevented the participation of actors who did not have formal land title.
The program now accepts proof of right of possession in lieu of title in some circumstances, enabling the poorest, smallest farmers to participate.
The PSA was initially developed as an untargeted program.
The program was not maximizing effectiveness in terms of improving biodiversity conservation as well as equity.
Biodiversity and socioeconomic priorities have been incorporated into the application process to enable increasing targeting of the program over time. FONAFIFO currently prioritizes conservation hotspot areas, as well as counties where there is a relatively low Social Development Index. These priorities are adjusted approximately every five years as other needs or gaps are identified.
The AMPF initially focused incentives on illegal settlers in the protected area who drove deforestation through coffee cultivation. Much of the benefit package emphasized technical support to shift coffee cultivation to more sustainable and more productive practices.
High deforestation continued in areas around the AMPF accompanied by declining social conditions and cultural values for adjacent indigenous peoples
AMPF benefit sharing was expanded to include indigenous peoples adjacent to the protected area. This required defining a new, specific theory of change related to drivers of forest loss on indigenous peoples' lands, often resulting from renting land to outsiders who then cleared forest for agriculture.
The financing model for Bolsa Floresta was initially based on state public funding and antificpated REDD+ payments.
In 2015, the initial state funding in Amazonas had been distributed and it was clear that PES/REDD+ programs would not provide sufficient ongoing finance.
The financing strategy was reoriented toward philanthropic funding from businesses and foundations, initially in Brazil and then internationally. A trust fund has also been established, whereby the interest generated is used to finance the monetary disbursements while the base endowment is maintained.
Australia's Carbon Farming Initiative was designed with relatively stringent requirements and processes for participation, including a requirement that the project proponent is the landowner.
The high transaction costs for participation proved challenging for smaller-scale landowners to participate.
The subsequent ERF facilitates aggregation—so the project proponent no longer needs to hold the carbon sequestration rights but can have a contract with the landowner—with standard arrangements for transferring rights to a project aggregator to help reduce transaction costs.
